The Rest of the Story

I just read an article today.  First I'm going to tell you what is not interesting about it, then I'll get to the interesting part.

Thinking the Pain Away

By Ingrid Wickelgren
ScienceNOW Daily News
12 December 2005

Researchers have developed a potentially powerful new tool that allows patients to fight pain by literally thinking it away. Volunteers put inside a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) machine were able to control the activity of a brain region responsible for pain perception, suggesting that the technology may someday provide a drug- and side-effect-free way to calm troubled nerves. [...]

This is basically an enhanced form of biofeedback.  If people who are experiencing pain can see the level of activity in a certain pain center in the brain, they can learn to make that center less active, thus reducing the pain. The author mentions that the technique seems promising, except that the machines that make it possible cost two million dollars.  

The finding that patients can control pain with this kind of biofeedback is interesting, but the fact is, we already know that biofeedback works for other things, and it is not terribly surprising that this would work, too.

What provokes my curiosity is this:

By contrast, volunteers who were asked to change their rACC activity without fMRI feedback, or with sham feedback from another brain region or from another volunteer's rACC, could not effectively do so, and also failed to control their pain, the researchers report online this week in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. "We feel this is very strong evidence that the real-time fMRI information was necessary for this effect," deCharms says.

What this means, assuming it turns out to be replicable, is that there is something critical, not just about the feedback process in general, but about the particular kind of feedback that patients get from fMRI.  It does not work if you simply tell people to think their pain away.  I guess that is obvious, because if it were possible, we'd all be doing it routinely.  So what is it about the fMRI feedback that makes it work?  

But that is not the interesting part; this is:

It is extremely common for the friends and family of patients to feel frustrated and perplexed, that the patient is "letting" the symptoms or the illness get the better of them.  To the bystanders, it seems that it should be possible for the patient to think their way out of the problem.  The bystanders, in their ignorance, assume that the patient must have some motive for not doing so.  

This attitude is somewhat understandable.  After all, if it were possible to think one's way out a problem, and one did not do so, then it would be reasonable to assume that there must be some reason.  For example, if you believe that it is possible to think yourself out of pain, or depression, or anxiety (to use three common examples), and you remain afflicted by the pain/depression/anxiety, then there would have to be a reason.  

What the fMRI study shows is that the reason people don't think their way out of the pain is that they can't (without a $2,000,000 machine, and the assistance of some highly trained specialists.)  Give them the resources, and they do it, just like you would expect.  This would sugget that it is not necessary, or helpful, to assume that there must be a hidden agenda.  It is really quite simple.  The reason they don't do it, is that they can't do it.

I am ambivalent about writing an autism post, since there has been so much blogbuzz on the topic.  Much of the controversy has to do with two things: the notion that the incidence of autism is increasing, and the notion that mercury in vaccines has contributed to the increased incidence of the disorder.  The mercury issue has been pretty well hashed out by Orac, Paul, Skeptico, Autism Diva, and others...too numerous to count.  The "autism epidemic," likewise, had led to an epidemic of writing -- most of it bad.  A Google search on "autism epidemic" (with the quotes) turns up over 66,000 hits.  

And now I've come across another one.  It isn't new.  It was published in July 2005 on Medscape.  (Medscape articles require registration, which is free.  It is a bit of a nuisance, but Medscape is a pretty good resource, so it is worth the trouble.)  I mention this article because it may be one of the better articles on the question of whether the incidence of autism is increasing.  Furthermore, it illustrates some good general points about one of my favorite topics: skepticism.  

Autism "Epidemic?" A Newsmaker Interview With Morton Ann Gernsbacher, PhD, And Craig J. Newschaffer, PhD

Laurie Barclay, MD
July 15, 2005 

— Editor's Note: Despite heightened media attention on the autism "epidemic," a report published in the July issue of Current Directions in Psychological Science offers three arguments against a true increase in autism prevalence. These include changes in diagnostic criteria for autism, with current criteria being more inclusive than when the diagnosis was first defined in the 1940s; methodological flaws in an unpublished California study widely cited as showing dramatically increased prevalence; and problems in using the U.S. Department of Education's annual "child count" data.

To find out more about this issue and its clinical implications, Medscape's Laurie Barclay interviewed lead author Morton Ann Gernsbacher, PhD, a Vilas Research Professor, the Sir Frederic Bartlett Professor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and President-Elect of the American Psychological Society.

For an alternate viewpoint, Dr. Barclay also interviewed Craig J. Newschaffer, PhD, an associate professor of epidemiology at the Center for Autism and Developmental Disabilities, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health in Baltimore, Maryland. Dr. Newschaffer is lead author of a study using cohort curves to suggest that autism prevalence has been increasing with time, as reported in the March issue of Pediatrics. [...]

The article provides a nice balance of viewpoints, all from persons with decent qualifications.  Reading it is a good exercise in critical thinking.  Reading it correctly requires good analytical skills.  To illustrate:

Medscape: What are the significant changes in diagnostic criteria for autism between 1980 and 1994?

Dr. Gernsbacher: Whereas the 1980 DSM-III entry required satisfying six mandatory criteria, the more recent 1994 DSM-IV offers 16 optional criteria, only half of which need to be met. Moreover, the severe phrasing of the 1980 mandatory criteria contrasts with the more inclusive phrasing of the 1994 optional criteria. For instance, to qualify for a diagnosis according to the 1980 criteria, an individual needed to exhibit ''a pervasive lack of responsiveness to other people." In contrast, according to 1994 criteria, an individual must demonstrate only ''a lack of spontaneous seeking to share.... achievements with other people'' and peer relationships less sophisticated than would be predicted by the individual's developmental level. The 1980 mandatory criteria of ''gross deficits in language development'' and ''if speech is present, peculiar speech patterns such as immediate and delayed echolalia, metaphorical language, pronominal reversal'' were replaced by the 1994 options of difficulty ''sustain[ing] a conversation'' or ''lack of varied ...social imitative play." ''Bizarre responses to various aspects of the environment'' became ''persistent preoccupation with parts of objects."

Furthermore, whereas the earlier 1980 (DSM-III) entry comprised only two diagnostic categories (infantile autism and childhood onset pervasive developmental disorder), the more recent 1994 (DSM-IV) entry comprises five. [...]

You will see a lot of people debating this point, without really knowing the details.  Some people will say that the increase in reported rates of autism "couldn't" be explained by changes in diagnostic methodology or criteria.  But it is clear -- once you understand all the verbiage, that is -- that the changes in diagnostic criteria were substantial.  Not only that, but the diagnostic categories were broadened, such that milder cases now qualify for a diagnosis.  These are really important points.  The point I am making here is this: you have to know the details, if you are going to make an informed comment on the subject.  This is not one of those areas where an intuitive guess about the numbers will have any validity; you can't say the numbers are just too big to be explained by one factor, and expect anyone to find that persuasive.

Another point is illustrated by the article, one that has nothing to do with autism.  Specifically, skepticism is not merely oppositional thinking; a good skeptic is comfortable saying "I don't know," when the evidence is not sufficient to draw a firm conclusion.  Similarly, a good skeptic is comfortable making a tentative decision.  Of course, when one makes a tentative decision, is is necessary to remember that the decision is not based on solid evidence.  Then, one can avoid the error of establishing complex, important decision trees that do not have solid roots.

Medscape: Why should we be cautious about this label ["epidemic"], given changes in diagnostic criteria and in heightened awareness and recognition of this condition?

Dr. Newschaffer: [...] I believe that there currently is little strong evidence supporting either hypothesis (real risk versus diagnostic bias) and that proponents of one versus another hypothesis seem to hold their view based mainly on the basis of beliefs that are fallacious – either that the increase has been so large [that] some of it has to be real, or that the heritable component of autism is so large [that] the increase over time must be due to diagnostic changes.

Notice the phrase: "little strong evidence supporting either hypothesis."   In other words, she just plain does not know, and will not say, which hypothesis is correct.  If the evidence is not there, it is not there.  Deal with it.  Just don't try to browbeat others into believing something that is not supported by sufficient evidence, merely because you have decided to make a tentative decision on the subject.